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Abstract  
This paper deals with different organisational forms of collaborative procurement and 
provides insight into when to use which form. Different forms from the literature are 
compared with empirical examples to give an overview of forms, which are then 
described in terms of strategy, skills and organisation. Whilst acknowledging variations, 
the paper distinguishes between two main forms: virtual networks and third party 
organisations. Using empirical data and four theoretical perspectives (transaction cost 
economics, resource based view, contingency theory, agency theory), the paper reflects 
on when which form can be used and presents an overall framework to help choose an 
organisational form.  
 
Key words: 
Collaborative procurement, organisational form, theoretical frameworks. 
 
Acknowledgements: 
The authors like to thank their colleagues from the Operations and Supply group at the 
University of Bath School of Management for their valuable comments, and in particular 




Collaborative procurement is horizontal collaboration between two or more organisations 
during one or more steps of the purchasing process. According to Jost et al. (2005), there 
are two main advantages to collaboration. The first is increased effectiveness through 
learning from each other and a better use of resources. As purchasing is evolving into a 
more strategic function (Reck and Long, 1988) and demands more strategic skills, 
collaboration can be a way of accessing these skills or freeing up resources to develop 
them. The second main advantage is an improved efficiency through reduction of 
transaction costs and increased economies of scale through bundling purchasing volumes 
(cf. Leenders and Fearon, 1997; Johnson, 1999). 
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One issue that can hinder or facilitate effective collaboration concerns the choice of the 
appropriate organisational form (Rozemeijer, 2000; Nollet and Beaulieu, 2003). Which 
form is chosen can be either the result of a ‘top-down’ policy decision or the result of a 
‘bottom-up’ evolutionary process. This paper is concerned with creating an ‘ideal picture’ 
of when which form would be appropriate. The paper is exploratory and conceptual, 
drawing heavily on a variety of theoretical frameworks. As internationally, horizontal 
collaboration receives a lot of attention in public sector organizations, we focus on the 
public sector. Collaborative procurement however is a broad concept and we hence belief 
the relevance of this paper goes beyond the public sector. Practical examples of 
collaborative procurement initiatives, which we derived from interviews, will be used to 
inform our theoretical debate. The paper aims to investigate collaborative procurement 
and provide a framework to assess when to use which form.  
  
This paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we describe the methodology used to describe 
practical examples of collaborative procurement initiatives. We also discuss the 
theoretical underpinnings of our framework. Secondly, we look at the different forms of 
collaboration that exist in practice and theory. Thirdly, we describe different theories and 
assess when which form of collaboration would be most appropriate. Finally, we draw 
conclusions and propose further research avenues.   
   
 
Methodology 
The empirical data has been gathered in 33 exploratory interviews with public sector 
procurement practitioners involved in collaborative procurement in the United Kingdom 
(UK) healthcare (25x) sector and local government (8x) and desk research using 
websites, reports and news letters. The interviews were conducted to gain an 
understanding of different collaborative forms and the difficulties they encountered. 
Examples from the interviews illustrate our theoretical analyses. Conclusions on when to 
use which form are not based on these interviews, yet they have enabled us to interpret 
and use the theories in the context of collaborative procurement.  
 
We conducted a literature review and identified theories that had been drawn on in 
previous studies of collaborative procurement to explain organizational forms (e.g. 
Nooteboom, 1996; Arnold, 1997; Kamann et al, 2004; McCue and Prier, 2006; Bakker et 
al, 2006, Murray et al, 2006). This analysis of previous research led to limiting our focus 
to transaction cost economics, resource based view of the firm, contingency theory and 
agency theory.  
 
Some theories were deemed outside our scope. The resource dependency perspective 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) is not considered as it is used to explain why organisations 
collaborate. For example, organisations may gain more purchasing power to secure 
supply in a scarce supply market, or gain certain skills from other organisations that they 
do not possess themselves (Kamann et al, 2004). Other theories such as game theory and 
neo-classical theory focus on strategies for dealing with other organisations (Kamann et 
al, 2004), or retrospectively explain which form is chosen, not which is most appropriate 
(Bakker et al, 2006).  
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Forms of collaboration in procurement 
In this section we describe different forms of collaboration. First, we discuss forms found 
in the literature. Next, we describe forms found in our empirical study. Finally, we map 
all forms onto a continuum. 
 
Forms of collaborative procurement in the literature 
Two distinct structural forms of collaborative procurement can be recognised in 
the procurement literature: informal, virtual organisations and third party organisations. 
Virtual networks are member-owned and operate without (many) formal rules. Staff are 
not employed by the collaborative, nor are they dedicated specifically to the 
collaboration: collaborative working is often part of their other job at one of the member 
organisations. Third party organisations are separate organisations that are set up 
especially to manage and coordinate the collaboration. They have formal rules and staff 
specifically dedicated to the collaboration (Leenders and Fearon, 1997; Aylesworth, 
2003; Nollet and Beaulieu, 2005; Bakker et al., 2006). These extreme types can also be 
found in evolutionary models of collaborative procurement such as by D’Aunno and 
Zuckerman (1987), Johnson (1999) and Nollet and Beaulieu (2003). For example, 
D’Aunno and Zuckerman (1987) speak of “federations” as third party formal separate 
organisations and “coalitions” as voluntary networks. Also, when in literature more than 
two forms are mentioned in the literature (McCue and Prier, 2006; Aylesworth, 2007; 
Schotanus and Telgen, 2007), these two extremes are identifiable amongst the variations. 
One of the differences between Schotanus and Telgen (200) and Aylesworth (2007) is 
that the first authors explicitly include temporary project-based collaboration on 
exceptional projects such as IT infrastructure, telecom, or construction projects. 
Following previous work (Bakker et al., 2006), we do not treat time as an aspect of form 
in this article, as it is related to its existence and it would be difficult to take a cut-off 
point (i.e. how long does an initiative have to exist to keep referring to it as temporary?).  
 
In both extreme forms, some degree of collaboration has to be organised. An 
organisational form has to be chosen and designed (see Figure 1). The two forms 
represent either end of a sliding scale, with varieties per form that make up the continuum 
(cf. Bakker et al., 2006).  
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
Forms of collaboration in procurement in our empirical study 
In the UK there are many reports that refer to collaboration in procurement, such as in 
local government (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister/ODPM, 2003, 2004, 2006; 
Beecham, 2006) and the National Health Service – NHS – (Audit Commission, 1996; 
2001; NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency, 2002). Using these reports and our 
interviews, we find the following forms of collaboration: 
 Professional networks such as in orthopaedics and prosthetics in the NHS, or “Avon 
procurement forum” in local government. These are networks of people working in a 
service area that come together and exchange information and ideas on a certain 
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health service area or purchasing issue. Membership can be informal or formal and 
they do not necessary buy together. Networks around a service area can be large and 
national and require formal membership, or they can be more local and informal 
when focussing on specific procurement issues alone.  
 Lead Buying. Examples in local government are “Central Buying Consortium” or 
“Kent Buying Consortium”. NHS examples are “Supply Management 
Confederations” (e.g. “Peninsula Purchasing and Supply Alliance” and “Bristol and 
Weston NHS Purchasing Consortium”) and “Pharmacy Buying Consortia”. The NHS 
confederations and local government consortia vary in how formalised they are and to 
what extent they have dedicated staff (some have a board or overall CEO). Consortia 
type initiatives do not have dedicated staff and they tend to be run by a host 
organisation, which can rotate between members. They can share information systems 
and divide work, yet contract uptake cannot be mandated (cf. Cox et al, 2005). 
Contract uptake in Pharmacy Buying consortia is high as Pharmacists decide on what 
to collaborate and use the contract. These consortia are limited to buying non-
generics, i.e. patented pharmaceuticals. Generic drugs for wich the patent has expired 
are the responsibility of NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency (NHS PASA).  
 Shared services. This involves sharing activities and resources beyond purchasing 
services. An example is “Surrey County Council Shared Services” (CSS) or the “ISIS 
project” (“Improving Services In Somerset”). The latter however is close to 
collaborative procurement as an external provider is commissioned in a joint tender to 
provide the required services for multiple Councils. In procurement, shared services 
can involve sharing a procurement officer or procurement system, suitable for smaller 
councils that cannot afford dedicated procurement staff. A strategic procurement 
manager might be shared if councils only have clerical procurement staff (NPS, 2004; 
Bergeron, 2006; Murray et al, 2006).  
 Piggy backing. An example is a city council letting a smaller nearby council use its 
contract for a specific product category, benefiting from the same terms and 
conditions (cf. Schotanus and Telgen, 2007). This can also be applied when working 
across different sectors.  In the UK South West a city council offered the police their 
office supplies and paper contract.  
 Third party advisory. For example, the “Regional Centres of Excellence”, “OGC 
Buying Solutions” (OGC = Office of Government Commerce) and “NHS PASA”. 
Each is a separate body, has dedicated staff, advises on purchasing and facilitates 
collaboration between organisations. NHS PASA and OGC buying solutions are 
national bodies and also have national framework contracts, for which uptake can not 
be mandated.  
 Third party purchasing. For example “Eastern Shires Purchasing Organisation”, 
“Yorkshire Purchasing Organisation” in local government. Collaborative 
Procurement Hubs in the NHS such as “Healthcare Purchasing Consortium” and 
“Re:source”, These are separate organisations with dedicated staff, a separate board, 
and dedicated offices in a separate location. They charge a fee to cover costs for 
exercising purchasing activities for members, often against a promised return on 
investment. They tend to have rules about commitment. They are also referred to as 
“joint committees” as representatives of the members tend to sit on the board. 
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 Third party outsourcing. This is the outsourcing of the responsibility of a number of 
procurement categories to an outside, external provider. A clear example in the NHS 
is “NHS Supply Chain”, which is run by “DHL” in combination with “Novation”. 
The third party(s) take over complete responsibility and it becomes a standard 
outsourcing agreement between a buyer and supplier.  
 
The initiation of collaborative procurement can be treated as setting up a new 
organisation or sub-organisation, whether it is a third party or a virtual network. 
Congruency theory (Nadler and Tushman, 1979) and organisation design literature (cf. 
Mintzberg, 1976) describe the key components that make up organisations. These are: (1) 
strategy (what is the long term goal for collaboration, why do the organisations 
collaborate – effectiveness or efficiency?) (2) task (what does the collaborative initiative 
do, what is its focus?); (3) individuals and skills; (4) organisational structure, formal and 
informal. If we use these core elements we can describe the different forms in more detail 
(see table below). 
 
 <Table 1 about here> 
 
Forms of collaboration in procurement mapped  
All the variations, theoretical and empirical, can be mapped onto a continuum with the 
two extremes on each end (see Figure 2). In the next sections we discuss when which 
form of collaboration would be most appropriate.  
 
 <Figure 2 about here> 
 
Theoretical frameworks 
In this section we briefly discuss each theoretical framework and translate it to 
collaborative procurement. We then discuss in more detail when which form is most 
appropriate reasoning from the different theoretical frameworks. 
 
Transaction cost economical perspective 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) suggests that the best way to organise activities is 
when total transaction and production costs are lowest (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991). 
TCE assumes two pre-conditions: people behave opportunistically and have bounded 
rationality. Taking this into account, two extreme ways of organising activities are to use 
the market mechanism or a hierarchy. The choice depends on the balance between costs 
involved in organising activities in-house versus using the market to supply certain 
resources.  
 
Three factors affect transaction costs: uncertainty, asset specificity and frequency of the 
transaction. Transaction cost reduction is using fewer resources when conducting a 
transaction. As costs are relative to the objective for which certain activities are 
undertaken, potential benefits should also be taken into account.  
 
In the context of collaborative procurement, potential benefits are related to reducing the 
uncertainty experienced by each individual organization (Beverland, 2001). Volumes 
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may be bundled leading to a reduction of resource-use per volume and lower purchase 
prices. Transaction costs can be high in collaborative procurement initiatives (Hennart, 
1991; Williamson, 1991). Specifically, costs in collaborating are bargaining costs related 
to finding a partner, negotiating with that partner and setting up agreements. There are 
operational costs for managing the collaborative agreements, and risks of free-riding 
organizations. Cooperation is not limited to putting contracts in place to gain economies 
of scale. It includes the management of the relationship with the supplier, supply market, 
other stakeholders, and with each other. Hoffmann and Schlosser (2001) note that in the 
case of medium-asset specificity, forms such as lead-buying are considered the most 
transaction-cost-efficient organisational form (Williamson, 1991; Picot et al., 1996). 
 
Resource based view of the firm perspective 
The resource based view of the firm (e.g. Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Grant, 1995) 
is concerned with how organisation’s internal resource configurations can give a 
competitive advantage. This advantage is possible when one has resources that are non-
imitable, non-transferable, and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991). Although public sector 
organisations compete over funding (and with the introduction in the UK NHS of patient 
choice, also may compete over customers), overall the public sector’s core focus is not 
(yet) about competition. It is about how resources can improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of running a public sector organisation. In the context of collaborative 
procurement this means that organisations will work together if they do not have the 
resources, which can not advantageously be purchased by the market. They will also 
work together if they do not have purchasing power, either through volume or reputation 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). The extended resource based view also includes 
the resources of the wider network an organisation is in and acknowledges that strategic 
resources can be accumulated from the wider network (Matthews, 2003).  
 
Taking a resource based view of the firm can help explain certain forms. For example, in 
lead buying, expertise on different buying needs and markets is divided amongst partners. 
With piggy backing one partner does not have sufficient resources. Resources available 
in-house and in the network can be considered. Ideally, organisations should focus on 
what they are good at and/or develop what is important to their service and customers 
(patients, citizens in the public sector) and hand the rest over to others. (cf. core 
competences: Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Pooling similar buying needs implies a 
reduction in resources needed, reducing duplication for the purchase of those categories 
that will not give a competitive advantage.  
 
Contingency perspective 
In earlier work specific attention has been paid to contingency factors to explain the 
choice of a certain form of collaboration (Bakker et al, 2006). This work builds on 
contingency studies of Burns and Stalker (1961), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), and 
Mintzberg’s discussion on different organisational forms (1983) and takes into account 
the external environment in which collaboration takes place. Contingency theory suggests 
that with different degrees of uncertainty, different organisations are appropriate (Emery 
and Trust, 1965; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Thompson, 1967). In terms of collaborative 
procurement, the uncertainty of the supply market is important. The dynamics and 
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complexity of the supply market, are affected by the number of suppliers, pace of 
technological advance, entry barriers (Kraljic, 1983), heterogeneity of suppliers, 
regulations, politics, and societal factors.  
 
When the uncertainty to fulfil a buying need is perceived as high, collaborative initiatives 
can improve one’s strategic position and are appropriate to reduce this uncertainty 
(Hamel et al. 1989, Pisano and Teece 1989; Eisenhart & Schoonhoven, 1996). 
Uncertainty may be affected by the complexity and importance of the buying need. When 
the buying need is important on a local level, uncertainty reduction through collaboration 
seems most appropriate in the form of an informal collaboration and maybe limiting it to 
exchanging information to maintain local control. When a buying need is not important 
on a local level, reducing uncertainty can be more easily handed over to a third party. 
 
Agency theory perspective 
Agency theory focuses cooperation when one party delegates work to another party. 
Agency relationships are where one (or more) individuals – the principal - engage 
another person (or group of individuals) – the agent – to perform certain activities (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Hart, 1995; McCue and Prier, 2006). The agency perspective 
acknowledges that two actors in a relationship have different positions in the process of 
cooperation and that some control is given up which causes uncertainty. The relationship 
between the principal and the agent is often described using the metaphor of a ‘contract’ 
(Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). Agency theory aims to address this problem of uncertainty 
and loss of control by devising the most appropriate ‘contract’ trough outcome-based 
efforts and/or behaviour-based management efforts (Eisenhardt, 1989; Zsidisin and 
Ellram, 2003). Purchasing is a typical context in which there are principal-agent 
relationships that can be described as vertical relations, with the purchasing organisation 
being the principal and the supplier the agent (Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). In the context 
of collaborative procurement an important principal-agent relationship is horizontal, with 
the principal being a buying organisation that gives some control to another buying 
organisation that performs some procurement activities on their behalf. 
 
Problems in collaboration arise when there is a conflict of interest, or transaction costs 
are such that problems can not be completely dealt with through a formal agreement 
(Hart, 1995). Collaboration has the problem of mutual dependence (Nooteboom et al., 
1997) and problems occur because there is information asymmetry. This leads to 
uncertainty and risk – a concept also dealt with in TCE (Nooteboom, 1996). The extent to 
which someone will experience information asymmetry as a problem is related to the 
potential negative consequences (Thomas and Thomas, 1928). Information asymmetry 
can be due to a lack of information on the other organisation’s skills, capabilities, actions 
(opportunism), aims and expectations (Hart, 1995; McCue and Prier, 2006). Contracts are 
incomplete and open for interpretation, and uncertainty is also influenced by trust, which 
can alleviate information asymmetry (Nooteboom et al, 1997). Information can be held 
back on purpose when there are different agendas or priorities.  
  
Principal-agent relationships can become increasingly complicated when there are 
multiple layers of agency, or where one actor can act as a principal and as an agent in a 
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relationship with the same actor such as in lead-buying arrangements (McCue and Prier, 
2006). Given the inescapable presence of principal agent relationships, agency theory can 
help determine which form is most appropriate to reduce information asymmetry.  
 
 
The choice of organisational form in collaborative procurement  
In this section, we use theoretical frameworks to assess which factors influence when 
which form is most appropriate. Although we acknowledge the different variations in 
form, we use the theory to first discuss the two extreme forms and come back to the 
variations in the discussion section. 
   
Virtual networks as a form of collaborative procurement 
 
Transaction cost economical perspective 
The TCE perspective helps to explain organisational form when we look at costs and 
benefits related to purchasing transactions. When initial costs are high and potential 
benefits are uncertain, choosing a form with low set-up costs such as a virtual network 
type organisation seems more appropriate. Examples can be found in UK local 
government where two councils in the South West of England started with a pilot on 
temporary agency staff. Also, some collaborative procurement Hubs started years ago 
trialling only a small part of the potential portfolio, slowly growing into larger more 
formalised third party type organisations (cf. evolutionary models by D’Aunno and 
Zuckerman, 1987; Johnson, 1999; Nollet and Beaulieu, 2003).  
 
TCE also helps to explain form by looking at the three factors that influence transaction 
costs: uncertainty, specificity, and frequency. High uncertainty of product use, potential 
benefits, contract uptake, and alternatives in supply markets means there is a high 
information need. This leads to high set-up and contract management costs. A small scale 
virtual type collaboration seems more appropriate to enable members to overcome this 
uncertainty and keep costs down.  
 
When collaboration is about a specific purchase, meaning the specificity of the 
transaction is high, this makes setting up a separate organisation with all its costs 
inappropriate. Using the expertise of another organisation in a lead-buying or piggy-back 
arrangement is then more suitable and could take the form of a one-off project (cf. 
Schotanus and Telgen, 2007).  
 
When the purchase is unlikely to be repeated, which means the buying need is infrequent, 
it is appropriate to collaborate through a virtual type organisation to keep overall 
transaction costs for that purchase low and not having to support a formal separate 
structure. However, when the frequency of information exchange is high (e.g. for a 
complex buying need), a small, local virtual type collaborative form seems more suitable 
to allow for easy communication and to ensure commitment. 
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Resource based view of the firm perspective 
The Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm perspective helps to inform organisational 
choice by assessing what is ‘key’ for service delivery and hence when local control is 
required or when this control can be handed over to a third party. Organisations should 
keep some control over the procurement of those products and services that are crucial 
for local service delivery. In terms of purchasing portfolio categories (Kraljic, 1983): 
strategic and bottleneck items can be bought under local control and a virtual network is 
appropriate. However, certain goods or services that seem generic and can be classified 
as ‘leverage’ do require some customisation (e.g. accountancy services). These need 
some local control, and it is not appropriate in each leverage scenario to hand the 
responsibility over to a third party.  
 
Following the extended resource based view, the procurement of certain services or 
products are important for functioning as a public sector organisation. If an organisation 
does not possess the capabilities, it can be worthwhile developing them by learning from 
others or training staff. In this case, virtual type organisations seem appropriate to allow 
learning to take place and to build up the required expertise.  
 
Contingency perspective 
Taking a contingency perspective, collaboration in a virtual informal network is 
appropriate when there is more uncertainty as there is more local control and flexibility to 
reduce uncertainty. This is appropriate in a dynamic and heterogeneous environment, or 
when dealing with a complex buying need. An example is the buying of non-generic 
pharmaceuticals in NHS Pharmacy Buying Consortia. They deal with patented products 
in an innovative market with continuous development, with many products to choose 
from. Also, in a dynamic market e.g. in terms of price or technology, collaborative 
contracts for non-investment goods might not always provide the best deal, specifications 
are harder to agree, and contracts tend to be shorter to enable taking advantage of new 
developments. The latter means the benefit of reduced transaction costs is minimised. 
Furthermore, collaborative agreements could constrain further developments in the 
market, as it takes out some of the competition. 
 
Furthermore, one of the main risks of hierarchical collaboration through a third party is 
that it can inhibit innovation. Hence, when dealing with dynamic supply markets, local 
collaboration in the form of loosely tied networks seems more appropriate, as it limits the 
bureaucracy that can stifle innovation (Goodwin et al, 2004).  
 
Agency theory perspective 
Taking the agency perspective, the appropriate form depends on when there is the least 
likelihood of information asymmetry. Or, when less information is unproblematic (e.g. a 
smaller council that does not have expertise in buying a certain commodity is happy to 
hand responsibility over).  
 
Clinicians often have a role in choosing products and services in the NHS (Cox et al, 
2005) If procurement has a facilitating role and internal users such as clinicians are 
powerful, there is likely to be a greater information asymmetry between members, as 
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procurement cannot control contract uptake. Clearly established processes and procedures 
could limit freedom of choice and could help build trust and common expectations 
(Goodwin et al, 2004). Yet, it may be better to ‘start’ informally in the form of a network 
(e.g. Nollet and Beaulieu, 2003). The bigger collaborative initiatives are in terms of 
number of members and geographical scope, the more difficult it will be to communicate 
to reduce information asymmetry, especially through face-to-face contact. In situations 
where member organisations want to be in control because of the importance of a 
purchase, or need to have local input because of powerful internal stakeholders, virtual 
type collaborations are more appropriate. An example of this is the Pharmacy Buying 
Consortia where local Pharmacy departments have a great influence in determining what 
they collaborate on. 
 
Third party organisations as a form of collaborative procurement 
 
Transaction cost economical perspective 
Using the transaction cost economical perspective, a third party can be used to take care 
of the whole purchasing process and management of the contract. This is appropriate 
when the benefits in the pre-contract and contract phase (no duplication of setting 
specifications, selecting suppliers and contracting suppliers; cost savings through lower 
price, better quality or additional service) outweigh the costs in the post-contract phase 
(the management of the contract with the supplier and user organisations). The more 
frequent the transaction – when it is a re-buy situation and requires frequent ordering 
(Robinson and Faris, 1967), third party collaboration is appropriate, as the set-up and 
coordination costs of a third party can be spread out over multiple transactions. A good 
example is NHS-Supply Chain which has taken over the purchasing responsibility of 
some main commodity groups from the NHS.  
 
Resource based view of the firm perspective 
Items that are non-core and not important for local service delivery can be bought 
through a third party. In portfolio terms (Kraljic, 1983), third parties can be used for 
routine and leverage items. In terms of the extended RBV, a third party can be used when 
at a local level skills and capabilities do not need to be developed for that specific 
category of products or services.   
 
Contingency perspective 
Using a contingency perspective, a third party can be used when the buying need and 
environment are simple. It is easier to hand-over responsibility as there are less 
unknowns. An example is the negotiation of framework contracts of generic (non-
branded) pharmaceuticals by the NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency for Pharmacy 
departments in the UK. When a market is dynamic and the buying need is complex, but 
not important, it is less risky to collaborate through a third party.  
 
Agency theory perspective 
Information asymmetry is related to the potential for negative consequences. 
Collaboration through third party organisations is appropriate with commodity type 
products such as stationary, as information asymmetry is low and the negative 
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consequences when things would go wrong around buying stationery are relatively low. 
This evidenced by the NHS collaborative procurement Hubs or national framework 
contracts which started with commodity type products. Procedures have been put in place 
that reduce maverick buying and constrain the room for opportunism (Nooteboom et al, 





We have used different theoretical perspectives to help to assess when the two main 
forms of collaboration are appropriate by focussing on different factors (see Table II). All 
the factors that we derived from the theoretical frameworks have to be taken into 
consideration together, as they all show a different part of the picture. The framework in 
the table provides a starting point for discussion and reflection on when to use which 
form. If different factors score on different sides of the continuum a trade-off will have to 
be made.  
 
 <Table 2 about here> 
 
Variants of the main forms 
 
Transaction cost economical perspective 
If the cost-benefit ratio of collaboration would be unevenly spread, as is the case when 
organisations of different sizes work together, piggy backing seems appropriate. As the 
smaller organisation (e.g. local authority) may not have excess resources lead-buying or 
sharing an officer would be relatively difficult to realise, and the larger authority becomes 
the sole lead-buyer. The effectiveness of this form depends very much on the incentive 
for the larger authority to allow piggy backing as costs and benefits are unevenly spread. 
The incentive can be an improved reputation, or the small organisation can pay a small 
fee to cover some costs.  
 
Professional networks can be used as a starting point for collaboration in the case when 
benefits are likely to be low (low frequency of demand), buying asset specific products 
and where costs could be high. If collaboration has to start from scratch, trust and 
familiarity has to be built up. Sharing tasks in the form of lead-buying or sharing 
resources in the form of shared services can be chosen when uncertainty is low (dealing 
with standard products), frequency of demand is high and benefits are unclear. Setting up 
a separate organisation would be inappropriate due to costs.  
 
Resource based view of the firm perspective 
The choice between a professional network and lead-buying lies in the relativeness of the 
qualitative judgement of ‘importance’. Professional networks can be used for important 
categories whereas lead buying is appropriate for products of relatively lesser importance. 
In principal, lead-buying arrangements can cover similar product categories to third party 
purchasing initiatives, yet which form one chooses will depend on the cost-benefit picture 
(see TCE above). Complete outsourcing could be done for product categories that are 
unimportant and local input is unnecessary, such as stationary. Third party purchasing 
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would cover those categories that more directly affect the primary process but are still not 
core (e.g. MRO goods). A third party advisor could be useful when products are 
important and local control of the specifications is required, yet which could benefit from 
some central coordination or standardised process. An example is CT scanners in the 
NHS. They have a huge impact on hospital turnover, yet the tender process (under EU 
regulations) is relatively standard. Suppliers and hospitals would benefit from a centrally 
coordinated plan to pre-empt supplier problems on resource utilisation in manufacturing, 
and a standardised approach to make tender processes more efficient. 
 
Contingency perspective 
Using the contingency framework, the choice between either professional networks and 
lead-buying, or third party-third party purchasing and third party-outsourcing depends on 
the scale of uncertainty. This is influenced by supply market dynamics and complexity of 
the buying need. For example, a third party-advisory collaboration seems appropriate 
when the market is stable, and the third party can help define the need and support the 
tendering process. If the buying need is more straightforward, the third party can help 
standardise the sourcing and tendering process. If the market is stable and the buying 
need is a simple re-buy, third party purchasing seem appropriate. 
 
Agency theory perspective 
Agency theory can help explain some of the variation in forms. In instances where there 
is information asymmetry, such as between a big city council and a small local authority, 
piggybacking seems appropriate. Parties might not put a high value on the asymmetry, 
and overcoming the different levels of expertise is unlikely. If collaborating councils all 




In general, virtual organisations tend to be small scale where there is direct and 
immediate interaction between stakeholders. Third party organisations tend to be larger 
organisations, and more regional or national, working with a larger membership base, as 
they have to support their infrastructure. Professional networks can be national, regional, 
or local. The latter generally can be more collaborative due to ease of contact between 
neighbouring councils/hospitals. National / subject area groups are also forms of 
collaboration and tend to be very informal. Beyond third party purchasing is outsourcing 
to the private sector, relinquishing public sector control.  
 
Building on the evolutionary models of collaborative procurement, collaboration can be 
seen to start with virtual professional networks where people know each other and start to 
buy together. This can lead to a form of lead-buying, shared services or piggy backing. 
Which form evolves depends on the ease of showing benefits against low costs (e.g. can 
we share the burden? Is there a lack of resources and expertise to start with? Is there a big 
authority nearby who already has good contracts in place?). Whether then collaboration 
evolves to a more independent third party depends on the other factors outlined in the 
framework. When more buying categories become the subject of the collaboration 
between local authorities or hospitals, there is an impact on the cost-benefit ratio. This 
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depends on if the same resources can be used (same IT system, same purchasing officer, 
etc). This would inevitably impact on which form could be appropriate (e.g. the more 
they collaborate on different activities, the more it can make sense to use a third party 
form).  
 
The theoretical frameworks are useful in assessing when to use the extreme forms of 
collaboration but are more difficult to apply for the different variations of the forms. The 
frameworks can be used to focus on constraints. For example, the resource based view of 
the firm is helps to focus on which resources are lacking when explaining the choice 
between shared services, piggy-backing and lead-buying.  
 
The limitation of the framework is that it uses mostly qualitative factors and indicators 
and no ‘hard’ measurements. However, it may help to facilitate internal discussions on 
different forms. It can be used as a tool to assess which form might be most appropriate 
for different buying needs or when developing a strategic plan. Future research could 
focus on further empirical testing of our initial framework, extending it by including 
more perspectives and private sector organizations. It would be of value to include ‘hard’ 
measurements. Further research could also more specifically explore constraints and why 
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Main form 2: 
Collaboration through a virtual network
Variance:
Main form 1:
Collaboration through a third party
Variance:
No rules, very informal and 
voluntary
A few working rules on 
compliance and division of 
tasks, otherwise informal 
and voluntary
Third party only 
coordinates, is supportive 
/ advisory, no mandate, 
members operate 
collaboration, few working 
rules
Third party takes over, 
operates collaboration, 
members give authority to 
third party, formal rules.
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from each other to 
build up in-house 
skills and knowledge. 
Exchange 
information, 
experiences and data 
(occasionally, some 
consolidation of 
spend for general 
commodities). 
Involvement from purchasers 
and / or internal users. Main 
skills and knowledge around 
product categories and their 
application (not necessarily 
purchasing). Strategic and 
communication skills required. 
Voluntary relationships, 
individuals involved do so within 
own role. When it requires much 
time and resources internal 
management support is required. 
Collaboration often based on prior 
















information and buy 
from same contract. 
Management of 
relationships with 
supplier and host 
council. Host to 
proceed as usual, 
keep in mind needs 
of piggy backers. 
Purchasers at host organisation 
needs negotiation, 
communication and supplier 
relation management skills. 
Piggy backer needs operational 
skills when ordering from 
contract and responsible for 
informing host organisation on 
uptake and supplier 
performance.  
Voluntary relationships. Clear 
communication and agreements on 
expectations and contract usage 
between host and piggy backer and 
assuring agreement with supplier, 
few meetings especially in initial 
phase, ordering done by piggy 
backer. Relations, language and 
beliefs based on proximity and 






develop skills and 
capabilities. Learn 
from shared services. 
Exchanging 
experiences. 
Individual will have purchasing 
knowledge and skills and will 
need to have good negotiating 
skills to deal with multiple 
organisations’ demands. 
Organisations have to agree 
responsibility and duties in terms 
of time, finance, support. 
Relationships and communication 
occurs between staff from sharing 
organisations but shared 
purchasing officer becomes central 
contact to link cultures, beliefs and 
ideas. 
“Lead-buying” Improve efficiency 
and effectiveness, 
take advantage of 
combined buying 
power and develop 
specialist skills in 
specific product 
categories. 
Create division of 
tasks based on 
experience or turn-
over, to reduce 
transaction cost and 
benefit from 
economies of scale. 
Individuals from different 
members involved. Purchasers 
need negotiation, 
communication and technical 
skills and knowledge.  
Voluntary relationships. 
Agreements on division of tasks, 
exchange of data, priorities, 
contract uptake and termination. 
Tasks undertaken independently, 
but when more developed, possibly 
agreements on purchasing 
procedures. Created dependency, 






and develop skills by 
making use of 
centralised expertise. 
Gain specialist 
knowledge and skills, 
advice members 
and/or help to 
promote profile and 
importance of 
purchasing. 
Staff works for third party, 
focus on marketing purchasing 
services, highly knowledgeable, 
skilled, experienced, good 
interpersonal skills.  
Use of third party often cannot be 
mandated. If used, clarity on fees 
and performance measurement 
necessary. Different users of third 
party can start to build 













Take over purchasing 
responsibility from 
members but with 
member input.  
Staff works for third party, have 
in-depth purchasing skills and 
market knowledge of variety of 
categories. Negotiation, 
communication and relationship 
management skills are 
important.  
Structured. Board of directors are 
representatives of members. 
Agreements on division of tasks, 
purchasing processes, who to 
involve when, exchange of data, 
priorities, contract uptake and 
termination. Agreements on 
objectives, performance 
measurement, savings allocation 







Third party to 
provide purchasing 
and logistics service 
for customers 
Individuals work for third party. 
No member influence other than 
specifying requirements and 
customer feedback. Negotiation, 
Structured, once deal is made, 
normal purchasing contract 
between client and third party 
provider put in place. Third party 
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communication and relationship 
management skills are 
important. 
becomes decoupled from members 












































































Figure 2. Mapping of variations of collaborative procurement on the two extreme forms. 
Note: project groups can be a few organisations that come together to try-out some collaborative contracts 
(e.g. through an e-tender), which can mean a project group is set-up consisting of member representatives, 
or it is run by a lead organisation without forming a separate new temporary organisation. Or, when dealing 
with exceptional projects (e.g. building projects) a project-team can be set-up as a separate temporary unit 
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Table II. Collaborative procurement framework – factors that influence form. 
Main two forms of collaboration Factors 
Collaboration through a 
virtual organisation (no 





(set-up costs, post-contract management costs, benefits/ 
advantages): 
- asset specificity 
- uncertainty 
- infrequency buying need 
- frequency information exchange  
High  
(relative high cost and little benefit) 
Low 
Core - non-core of collaboratively purchased 




- the environment: 
- dynamics 
- complexity 
- the buying need 
High  Low 
Potential information asymmetry: 
- presence of purchasing procedures 
- powerful internal stakeholders (internal users) 
- facilitating role of purchasing 
High Low 
Note: In this paper, we discuss situations in which collaborative procurement is preferred above individual 
procurement. 
 
